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"Certes," quod sche, "that schal I [undo] the be verray resoun, yif that tho thinges that I have concluded a litel herebyforn duellen only in hit first grauntynge."

Boece. "Thei dwellen graunted to the," quod I. (This to seyn as who seith, "I graunte thi forseide conclusyouns.")

"Have I nat schewed the," quod sche, "that the thinges that ben required of many folk ne ben not verray goodis ne parfite, for thei ben divers that on fro that othir; and so as iche of hem is lakkynge to othir, thei ne han no power to bryngen a good that is ful and absolut; but thanne at erste ben thei verraye good, whan thei ben gadred togidre [als] into o forme and into oon werkynge, so that thilke thing that is suffisaunce, thilke same be power, and reverence, and noblesse, and myrthe; and for sothe, but yif alle thise thinges ben alle o same thing, thei ne han not wherby that thei mowen be put in the nombre of thinges that oughten ben required or desired?"

Boece. "It is schewyd," quod I, "ne herof mai ther no man douten."

Philosophie. "The thinges thanne," quod sche, "that ne ben none goodis whan thei ben diverse, and whanne thei bygynnen to ben al o thing, thanne ben thei goodes — ne cometh it hem nat thanne be the getynge of unyte that thei ben maked goodes?"

Boece. "So it semeth," quod I.

"But alle thing that is good," quod sche, "grauntestow that it be good by the participacioun of good, or no?"

"I graunte it," quod I.

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"Thanne mustow graunten," quod sche, "by semblable resoun that oon and good be o same thing; for of thinges of whiche that the effect nys nat naturely divers, nedes the substaunce moot be oo same thing."

"I ne may nat denye it," quod I.

"Hastow nat knowen wel," quod sche, "that alle thing that is hath so longe his duellynge and his substaunce as longe as it es oon, but whanne it forletith to be oon, it moot nedys deien and corrumpen togidres?"

"In whiche manere?" quod I.

"Ryght as in beestes," quod sche, "whanne the soule and the body ben conjoyned in oon and dwellen togidre, it es cleped a beeste; and whanne her unyte is destroyed be the disseveraunce the toon fro the tothir, thanne scheweth it wel that it is a deed thing, and that it nys no lengere no beeste. And the body of a wyght, while it duelleth in oo fourme be conjunccion of membris, it is wel seyn that it is a figure of mankynde; and yif the parties of the body ben so devyded and disseverid the ton fro the tother that thei destroyen unite, the body forletith to ben that it was beforn. And whoso wolde renne in the same manere be alle thinges, he scholde seen that withouten doute every thing is in his substaunce as longe as it is oon; and whanne it forletith to ben oon, it dyeth and peryssheth."

Boece. "Whanne I considere," quod I, "manye thinges, I se noon other."

"Is ther any thing thanne," quod sche, "that, in as moche as it lyveth naturely, that forletith the talent or the appetyt of his beynge and desireth to come to deth and to corrupcioun?"

"Yif I considere," quod I, "the beestes that han any maner nature of wyllynge and of nyllynge, I ne fynde no beeste, but if it be constreyned fro withoute+forth, that forletith or despiseth the entencion to lyven and to duren; or that wole, his thankes, hasten hym to dyen. For every beest travaileth hym to defende and kepe the savacion of his lif, and eschueth deeth and destruccioun. But certes I doute me of herbes and of trees [and] I am in a doute of swiche thinges [as] ne han no felyng soules (ne no naturel werkynges servynge to appetites as beestes han, whether thei han appetyt to duellen and to duren).

"Certes," quod sche, "ne therof thar the nat doute. Now looke upon thise herbes and thise trees. They wexen first in suche places as ben covenable to hem, in whiche places thei mowen nat sone deye ne dryen, as longe as hir nature mai defenden hem. For some of hem waxen in feeldis, and some in mountaynes, and othere waxen in mareys, and othre cleven on roches, and some wexen plentyvous in soondes; and yif any wyght enforce hym to bere hem into other places, thei wexen drye. For nature yeveth to every thing that that is convenient to hym, and travailleth that they ne deie nat, as longe as thei han power to duellen and to lyven. What wiltow seyn of this, that thei drawen alle here norysschynges by here rootes, ryght as thei hadden here mouthes yplounged withynne the erthes, and sheden be hir maryes hir wode and hir bark? And what wyltow seyn of this, that thilke thing that is ryght softe, as the marie is, that it is alwey hyd in the seete al withinne, and that it is defended fro withoute by the stedfastnesse of wode, and that the outreste bark is put ayens the distemperaunce of the hevene as a deffendour myghty to suffren harm? And thus certes maistow wel seen how greet is the diligence of nature; for alle thinges renovelen and publysschen hem with seed ymultiplied, ne ther nys no man that ne woot wel that they ne ben ryght as a foundement and edifice for to duren, noght oonly for a tyme, but ryght as for to dure perdurably by generacion.

"And the thinges eek that men wenen ne haven none soules, ne desire thei nat, iche of hem, by semblable resoun to kepyn that that is hirs (that is to seyn, that is accordynge to hir nature in conservacioun of hir beynge and endurynge)? For wherfore ellis bereth lightnesse the flaumbes up, and the weyghte presseth the erthe adoun, but for as moche as thilke places and thilke moevynges ben covenable to everyche of hem? And forsothe every thing kepeth thilke that is accordynge and propre to hym, ryght as thinges that ben contrarious and enemys corrumpen hem. And yet the harde thinges, as stones,

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clyven and holden here parties togidere ryght faste and harde, and defenden hem in withstondynge that thei ne departe nat lyghtly atwynne. And the thinges that ben softe and fletynge, as is watir and eyr, thei departen lyghtly and yeven place to hem that breken or divyden hem; but natheles they retorne sone ageyn into the same thinges fro whennes thei ben arraced; but fyer fleeth and refuseth alle dyvisioun.

"Ne I ne trete not here now of willeful moevynges of the soule that is knowyng, but of the naturel entencioun of thinges, as thus: ryght as we swolwen the mete that we resseyven and ne thinke nat on it, and as we drawen our breeth in slepynge that we witen it nat while we slepyn. For certes in the beestis the love of hire lyvynges ne of hire beynges ne cometh not of the wilnynges of the soule, but of the bygynnynges of nature. For certes, thurw constreynynge causes, wil desireth and embraceth ful ofte tyme the deeth that nature dredeth. (That is to seyn as thus: that a man may be constreyned so, by som cause, that his wille desireth and taketh the deeth whiche that nature hateth and dredeth ful sore.) And somtyme we seen the contrarye, as thus: that the wil of a wyght distourbeth and constreyneth that that nature desireth and requirith alwey, that is to seyn the werk of generacioun, by whiche generacioun only duelleth and is susteyned the longe durablete of mortel thinges. And thus this charite and this love, that every thing hath to hymself, ne cometh not of the moevynge of the soule, but of the entencioun of nature. For the purveaunce of God hath yeven to thinges that ben creat of hym this, that is a ful grete cause to lyven and to duren, for whiche they desiren naturely here lif as longe as evere thei mowen. For which thou mayst not drede be no manere that alle the thinges that ben anywhere, that thei ne requiren naturely the ferme stablenesse of perdurable duellynge, and eek the eschuynge of destruccioun."

Boece. "Now confesse I wel," quod I, "that Y see wel now certeynly withouten doutes the thinges that whilom semeden uncerteyn to me."

Philosophie. "But," quod sche, "thilke thing that desireth to be and to duelle perdurably, he desireth to ben oon. For yif that oon weren destroyed, certes, beynge schulde ther noon duellen to no wyght."

"That is sooth," quod I.

"Thanne," quod sche, "desiren alle thinges oon."

"I assente," quod I.

"And I have schewed," quod sche, "that thilke same oon is thilke that is good."

Boece. "Ye, forsothe," quod I.

"Alle thinges thanne," quod sche, "requiren good; and thilke good thow mayst descryven ryght thus: good is thilk thing that every wyght desireth."

"Ther ne may be thought," quod I, "no more verraye thing. For eyther alle thinges ben referrid and brought to noght, and floteren withouten governour, despoyled of oon as of hire propre heved; or elles, yif ther be any thing to whiche that alle thinges tenden and hyen to, that thing muste ben the sovereyn good of alle goodes."

Philosophie. Thanne seide sche thus: "O my nory," quod sche, "I have greet gladnesse of the, for thow hast fycched in thyn herte the [marke of the] myddel sothfastnesse, (that is to seyn, the prykke). But [in] this thing hath ben discoveryd to the [that] thow seydest that thow wistest not a litel herbyforn."

"What was that?" quod I.

"That thou ne wistest noght," quod sche, "whiche was the ende of thinges. And certes that is the thyng that every wyght desireth; and for as mochel as we han gadrid and comprehendid that good is thilke thing that is desired of alle, thanne mote we nedys confessen that good is the fyn of alle thinges.